What is become of the rights of men? : are you the only men who have rights? ; moral contractarianism and the legitimation of universal human rights

In this article I advance an account of human rights as individual claims that can be justified within the conceptual framework of social contract theories. The contractarian approach at issue here aims, initially, at a justification of morality at large, and then at the specific domain of morality which contains human rights concepts. The contractarian approach to human rights has to deal with the problem of universality, i.e. how can human rights be ‘universal’? I deal with this problem by examining the relationship between moral dispositions and what I call ‘diffuse legal structure’

Socio-Economic Status, HIV/AIDS Knowledge and Stigma, and Sexual Behavior in India

Using data from the National Family Health Surveys (NFHS-3), this paper analyzes the socioeconomic correlates of sexual behavior, HIV/AIDS knowledge and stigma in India. The main findings are that, overall, the Indian population is faithful and abstains from sex with very small variations across socioeconomic classes. However, given the large size of the population, there is still room for some concern as condom use is low, knowledge about the disease is poor, and stigma is high; especially with respect to less educated, poorer, single males and women in general. Obvious policy recommendations are; therefore, to increase condom distribution and awareness, increase very heavily HIV/AIDS basic education, and promote women empowerment with respect to sexual choices.HIV/AIDS, Condom, Stigma, India

Calculating Welfare Costs of Inflation in a Search Model with Preference Heterogeneity: A Calibration Exercise

Using U.S. cross-sectional data, this paper calculates the welfare cost of a 10% inflation for different individuals and finds that the difference in cost between the poorest 10%, measured by their expenditure share on cash goods, and the richest 10% is in the order of 176%. That is, a poor person is on average willing to forgive 176% more of their total consumption in order to have inflation reduced from 10% to 0. In absolute terms this represents a cost of 2.687% of consumption for the poorest and 0.974% for the richest. I accomplish this by introducing preference heterogeneity in a monetary search model first developed by Lagos and Wright (2005), and calibrate the model to match the expenditure share on cash goods and total expenditures for each individual type using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the second quarter of 1996. I also show that this welfare difference increases to 210% (10.522% for the poorest 10% and 3.401% for the richest 10%) whenever frictions in the use of money are imposed (holdup problem). The ability to explicitly model these frictions is the advantage of using this model. Hence, inflation in this framework, as other studies have shown, acts as a regressive consumption tax; and this regressiveness is augmented with the holdup problem.Inflation, welfare, search, holdup